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We revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated
with Chamberlin, Spence, and Dixit and Stiglitz when ﬁrms sell several
products. Both products and ﬁrms are envisaged as diﬀerentiated. We
propose a nested demand model where consumers decide upon a ﬁrm
then which variant to buy, and use it to determine the market’s biases
when ﬁrms compete in product ranges and prices. The market system
attracts too many ﬁrms with too few products per ﬁrm: ﬁrms restrain
product ranges to relax price competition, but this exacerbates over-
entry. The results extend to generalized nested CES models.
KEY WORDS: Multiproduct ﬁrms, excess variety, nested demand, prod-
uct line competition
JEL Classiﬁcation: L11, L13, D431 Introduction
The economic analysis of the market provision of variety goes back to
Hotelling (1929) and Chamberlin (1933). Hotelling was concerned with
product selection for duopoly, whereas Chamberlin was interested in free
entry equilibrium. The Chamberlinian monopolistic competition model
was later examined rigorously by Spence (1976) and by Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977). These papers, along with almost all of the subsequent literature
have assumed that each ﬁrm produces a single product. The intention
of this paper is to broaden the discussion of market performance by
allowing ﬁrms to produce several products and developing a tractable
demand system for analyzing the problem.
The analysis of multiproduct ﬁrms introduces a further dimension
to competition, that of the product range. When a ﬁrm brings in a
further variant to its product line, it attracts more custom but at a cost
of cannibalizing its existing products. The decision also has a strategic
eﬀect that the ﬁrm may prefer to mitigate. This is that rivals may price
more aggressively in the face of tougher competition. These eﬀects are
not addressed under the standard assumption of single-product ﬁrms.
The product range also contributes a further dimension to performance.
The reason why there has been little theoretical economic analysis
of price competition with multiproduct ﬁr m si st h a tt h ep r o b l e mi si n -
trinsically diﬃcult.1 To characterize proﬁt-maximizing prices for a ﬁrm
1See Katz (1984), Champsaur and Rochet (1989), and Shaked and Sutton (1990)
for previous analyses of multiproduct ﬁrms under price competition. Recent work
by Johnson and M (2003) and Grossman (2003) treats multiproduct ﬁrms under
1selling m products requires simultaneously solving m ﬁrst-order condi-
tions, each of which involves the derivatives of the demands for m prod-
ucts. Likewise, to ﬁnd the proﬁt-maximizing product range for a ﬁrm
necessitates ﬁnding not only the direct eﬀect on proﬁt from an additional
product, but also the equilibrium pricing response of all other ﬁrms for
all other products. Finally, the free-entry equilibrium is determined from
the condition that further entry be unproﬁtable.
To make the problem tractable, we set out a speciﬁc model and use
symmetry assumptions liberally for the demand functions (in the tradi-
tion of monopolistic competition). This symmetry leads to a symmetric
welfare benchmark. In our basic model, we parameterize diﬀerentiation
at two diﬀerent levels. These correspond to diﬀerentiation of products
within the ﬁrm, and diﬀerentiation across the ﬁrms themselves. The
demand for any particular variant sold by a ﬁrm then depends on the
two sources of product variety. Corresponding to the two levels of dif-
ferentiation, market performance can be gauged by two quantities: the
number of products per ﬁrm and the total number of ﬁrms. These two
measures are to be compared at the equilibrium to the corresponding
magnitudes for the social optimum.
The demand model has considerable interest in its own right. Al-
though we treat all the variants produced by any ﬁrm as equally good
substitutes for each other, and we assume symmetry in the choice of
which ﬁrm to buy from, the substitution pattern across variants pro-
Cournot competition.
2duced by diﬀerent ﬁrms can be rather complex. We consider a general
nested demand structure that builds on the nested logit model ﬁrst pro-
posed in the transportation context by Ben-Akiva (1973) and rational-
ized by McFadden (1978). The nested logit model was subsequently used
theoretically by Anderson and de Palma (1992) to study the performance
of multiproduct ﬁrms and in several empirical studies in industrial or-
ganization.2 The idea behind our nested demand model is that product
selection can be split into a two-stage process. First, consumers choose a
ﬁrm, then subsequently they choose a speciﬁc product to buy from that
ﬁrm. When choosing a ﬁrm, consumers anticipate they will then opti-
mally choose among the products available, although at this stage they
do not know exactly what products are available. Think of restaurants:
a consumer may not know exactly what is on the menu on a given day,
but she knows that she will choose optimally once she gets there, and
she anticipates her expected utility level.3 The two levels of diﬀerentia-
tion in the model correspond to the diversity across restaurants and the
diversity within a restaurant’s menu.
In the basic model, we assume that each consumer buys one unit
o fo n ep r o d u c t .T h i sa s s u m p t i o nm a k e si ts i m p l et oc a r r yo u tt h ew e l -
fare comparison because social surplus is independent of the price level,
2A sophisticated application of the nested logit model by Goldberg (1995) studies
ﬁrm pricing in the car market.
3The two-stage process described here can readily be extended to three or more
stages. For example, a consumer may choose for her vacation a country, then a resort,
then a hotel.
3and we can then directly compare market equilibrium with the ﬁrst-best
optimum solution. Later on we allow for downward sloping individual
demand. For this case, we compare the second-best (zero proﬁtc o n -
strained) optimum to the equilibrium. The extension of the basic analy-
sis is fairly straightforward, but it broadens the scope considerably. This
extension also encompasses the nested CES model. We also describe in
this section a class of generalized nested demand models that have a
consumer theoretic foundation with consumers making discrete choices
of which product to buy.4
The performance analysis can be summarized quite succinctly. Firms
hold back on product ranges in order to relax price competition.5 Indeed,
a broader product range makes the ﬁrm more attractive to consumers
and so provokes a more competitive price response. Holding back elic-
its instead a more comfortable pricing environment. However, this also
means that ﬁrm proﬁtability is higher than it would be with more ag-
gressive (larger) product ranges so that the market signal for ﬁrms to
enter (i.e., proﬁt) is stronger than the social signal (surplus contribu-
tion). This means that the market solution has too many ﬁrms, each
one with too narrow a product range.6
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an
4Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) use a similar procedure to disaggregate
the standard CES representative consumer model. Verboven (1996) does likewise for
the nested logit and generalized CES models.
5This is the same reason that ﬁrms choose diﬀerent qualities in models of vertical
diﬀerentiation - see Shaked and Sutton (1982).
6Some alternative market structures are discussed in the conclusions.
4overview of the analysis. In Section 3, we introduce the demand func-
tion and the nesting structure. In Section 4, we derive the social welfare
function, establish symmetry, and characterize the ﬁr s tb e s to p t i m u m
number of ﬁrms and the optimal variety oﬀered by each ﬁrm. In Sec-
tion 5, we compute the equilibrium game: ﬁrms decide ﬁrst whether to
enter the market or not, then how many products to oﬀer, and ﬁnally
how to price them. We then compare the market solution and the opti-
mal solution, and show that the market induces over-entry of ﬁrms and
under-provision of variety per ﬁrm. In section 6,w ee x a m i n et h ec a s eo f
variable individual consumption. Section 7 concludes with some further
discussion.
2O v e r v i e w
Let there be n ﬁrms, indexed i =1 ...n,a n dl e tF i r mi produce mi prod-
ucts, indexed k =1 ...mi. The demand for product ik (the kth product
of Firm i)i sg i v e nb y
Dik = NPiPk|i, (1)
where N is the number of consumers in the market, Pi is the fraction
of consumers buying from ﬁrm i,a n dPk|i is the fraction of consumers
who choose product ik given that they have selected Firm i.C o s t sp e r
unit produced are constant at rate c,a n dt h eﬁxed costs for Firm i
producing mi products are K (mi)=k0 +k1mi. The optimal allocation
is symmetric, and at a symmetric allocation, Pi will equal 1/n while Pk|i
will equal 1/m.
5The optimum values of n and m are determined from costs and the
consumer beneﬁt function that underlies the demand system. Speciﬁ-
cally, the consumer beneﬁt function may be written as a weighted sum of
the beneﬁts from variety at each level, the two levels being the product
range and the ﬁrm. The relative importance of each level is described by
weights σA and σB that reﬂect the heterogeneity of the two levels. The
key component beneﬁt functions are increasing and concave functions
that are written as A(m) and B(n) respectively, and so depend on the
amount of variety available at each level.
The market equilibrium is the outcome of a three-stage game involv-
ing entry, product ranges, and prices. The equilibrium number of ﬁrms
is determined by a zero proﬁt condition, so N
nm (p − c)=K (m),w h e r e
p is the price per unit. The equilibrium number of products per ﬁrm is
determined from a marginal proﬁt condition that accounts for both the
direct eﬀe c to fa ne x t r ap r o d u c ti nt h er a n g ea n dt h es t r a t e g i ce ﬀect on
other ﬁrms’ prices. The latter eﬀect is negative because further prod-
ucts provoke more price competition from rivals, which the ﬁrm wants
to avoid. The former eﬀect depends on the extra beneﬁtt oc o n s u m e r s
from more product variety, and so is proportional to A0(m):t h i sl i n kt o
the optimal problem is what enables us to ﬁnd the direction of the bias
in the market system.
The equilibrium mark-up is determined from the derivative of Pi
when this is evaluated at a symmetric solution. This mark-up is in-
versely proportional to Ω(n),w h e r eΩ(n) is a third key component of
6the model. It, like B(n), is determined by the tastes underlying the con-
sumer demand function. Under symmetry, the marginal social beneﬁt
from a further ﬁrm is proportional to B0(n) while the net revenue from
an nth ﬁrm is proportional to 1/nΩ(n) ( t h ec o n s t a n to fp r o p o r t i o n a l -
ity being the same). The comparison of the equilibrium and optimum
numbers of ﬁr m si st h e nm a d ep o s s i b l eb yu s i n ga ni n e q u a l i t yp r o v e d
in Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995); that B0(n) < 1/nΩ(n),
implying roughly that the private incentive to enter exceeds the social
one. In the sequel, we ﬂesh out the details.
3 Nested demand
Our model of choice is inspired from the nested logit model used in
many econometric applications (see e.g. Train, 2003). We model choice
as a two-step procedure. First, a consumer selects a ﬁrm (ﬁrms are
synonymous with nests), then she buys one unit of one of the variants
that the selected ﬁrm sells.
Recall from (1) that the demand for product ik (sold by Firm i)i s
Dik = NPiPk|i, which is written as the product of two fractions: the
fraction of consumers buying from i and the (conditional) fraction of
those buyers who then choose the particular variant. This latter fraction,
Pk|i, is determined from a discrete choice model in the following manner.
Once a consumer has chosen a ﬁrm, she draws a vector of match values,
 1|i... mi|i (one for each of the ﬁrm’s mi variants), and chooses the variant
7for which the conditional utility
uk|i = y − pik + σA k|i, (2)
is greatest. Here pik is the price of Firm i’s kth variant, σA ≥ 0 para-
meterizes the degree of substitutability among i’s variants (for a given
distribution of  1|i... mi|i)a n dy is consumer income.
The N individuals are assumed to be statistically identical and inde-
pendent (that is, their preferences are the realization of the same prob-
ability distribution). The  k|i are assumed to be i.i.d. random vari-
ables (across variants and individuals) with zero mean and unit vari-
ance, i =1 ...n, k =1 ...mi. Their common density function, f(.),i s
twice diﬀerentiable and log-concave over a convex support I2 (that is,
ln f(.) is concave).7 Since the individuals are statistically identical, the
expected fraction of consumers selecting product k is equal to the condi-
tional probability that an individual, randomly chosen in the population
(given her previous choice of Firm i) selects product k. Therefore (1)
represents the expected demand for product ik. The conditional prob-
ability that an individual selects product k given she chooses nest i is
the probability that product k gives her the highest utility among all
alternatives in nest i.T h a t i s Pk|i =P r o b {uk|i ≥ u |i, =1 ...mi} for
k =1 ...mi and i =1 ...n,o r :
7Most of the usual distributions used in economics (uniform, normal, Gumbell,
log-normal, beta, gamma, etc.) are log-concave. Log-concavity plays an important
role in showing existence of a Nash price equilibrium with diﬀerentiated products, as











for which choice k in nest i yields the largest utility:
B(k|i) ≡
½
ek : y − pik + σAek =m a x
l=1...mi
(y − pil + σAel)
¾
.















where F(.) is the common cumulative distribution of  k|i.T oi n t e r p r e t
this expression, notice that F ((pi  − pik)/σA + x) in (4) is simply the
probability that product ik is preferred to product i  when the match
value for product ik is x. Given the i.i.d. assumption, the product term
in (4) is the probability that ik is the most preferred of i’s variants given
ad r a wx. Integrating over all possible x then gives the probability that
ik is bought, conditional on buying from i.
The choice of ﬁrm is determined in a similar manner using the attrac-
tiveness of the various ﬁrms. Let Vi denote the attractiveness of Firm i,
measured as the expected consumer surplus that a consumer selecting
Firm i should expect. Hence Vi is the expected value of the maximum
of the conditional utilities uk|i, i =1 ...mi,s ow ec a nw r i t e












9Moreover, since the function f is continuous, then the suﬃcient con-
dition for diﬀerentiability under the integral sign holds, and we have
∂Vi /∂pik = −Pk|i (see (3)), where the domain of integration for demand




such that product ik is the most
preferred - which is the domain B(k|i).I ns u m m a r y ,w eh a v e :
Lemma 1. The within-nest conditional choice probabilities are given
by:
Pk|i = −∂Vi /∂pik . (6)
Note that (5) has all the properties of a (conditional) indirect utility
function (see Anderson et al., 1992), and that it is linear in income, y,
so that the result in the Lemma is eﬀectively Roy’s Identity.
When all of i’s variants are priced at the same price, pi,t h e nVi
reduces to8







Since A(mi) is the expected value of the maximum of mi i.i.d. random
variables, it is an increasing and strictly concave function. This is be-
cause getting more draws raises the expected value of maximum but at
8Roy’s identity also applies here insofar as it yields the conditional demand as 1,
which is just the assumption that each consumer buys one unit.
10ad e c r e a s i n gr a t e . 9 Thus A0 (mi) > 0 and A00 (mi) < 0. In what follows
we shall use a condition on the elasticity of A0 (mi):
ASSUMPTION A: Marginal intra-nest surplus is inelastic with respect




Note that this assumption holds for standard log-concave distribu-
tions such as the uniform and power functions, exponential, and the
double exponential (in which case the elasticity is −1).
We can now describe the consumer’s choice of ﬁrm. Like variants,
ﬁrms are also diﬀerentiated. Brand name, ﬁrm location, waiting time,
and quality of service all contribute to ﬁrm diﬀerentiation. Consumer
utility from choosing Firm i is assumed to be given by
ui = Vi + σBεi,i =1 ...n, (9)
where σB ≥ 0 parameterizes the degree of substitutability across ﬁrms.
We assume that the εi are i.i.d. random variables with zero mean and
unit variance with twice diﬀerentiable density function g(.),w h i c hi s
log-concave over its convex support I1. Hence,














9When the random terms are distributed according to the double exponential
(also known as the Gumbel), i.e. F (x)=e x p[ −exp(−x/µ2 − γ)],w h e r eγ is Euler’s
constant, then A(mi)=l nmi, which is clearly increasing and strictly concave in mi.
In this case, the IIA property restricts the scope of the demand model.
11where G(.) is the common cumulative distribution of εi (cf. (4) and
(5)). The special case where the random terms are double exponentially
distributed at both levels corresponds to the nested logit model treated
by Anderson and de Palma (1992). The framework considered here
allows for a broad palette of possible demand patterns at each level.
It is important for what follows in the equilibrium analysis to ﬁnd















w h e r ew eh a v et h u sd e ﬁned





n−2 (e)de > 0. (12)
We return to this key magnitude in the analysis of equilibrium.
3.1 Properties of the demand system
The nested demand system has some interesting properties that are
worth pointing out before we proceed. As expected, the demand ad-
dressed to Firm i increases as Vi increases and decreases as Vj increases
(j 6= i). The demand derivative for Firm i’s product k with respect to
















Ph|jPk|i ≥ 0,i 6= j.
(13)
Thus variants produced by diﬀerent ﬁrms are substitutes.













,  6= k. (14)
12The ﬁrst term is non-negative, whereas the second is non-positive.10
Conditional on choosing Firm i, i’s variants are substitutes (ﬁrst term);
however, when pil rises, Firm i becomes less attractive. This decreases
total demand for i’s variants and hence cuts into product k’s demand.
If the latter eﬀect outweighs the former, variants sold by Firm i are
complements. Otherwise they are substitutes.
Complementarity can arise when the nest eﬀect dominates, mean-
ing that a price rise deteriorates consumers’ evaluations of the ﬁrm so
much as to oﬀset within nest substitution into the other variants. If all
goods are substitutes, then McFadden (1981) has shown that under cer-
tain regularity conditions (see Anderson et al., 1992, Ch. 3 for details)
the demand system can be rationalized by a single-stage discrete choice
random utility model with consumer taste heterogeneity described by a
distribution of taste parameters across products and individuals. The
present approach uses a discrete choice random utility model with two
stages, the ﬁrst for the ﬁrm and the second for the particular variant.
T h u s ,i fa l lv a r i a n t sa r ea l w a y ss u b s t i t u t e s( i . e . ,i f( 1 4 )i sa l w a y s
positive), then the demand system does have a standard discrete choice
representation.11 O t h e r w i s ei td o e sn o t .W es h a l ls h o wb e l o wt h a tt h e
demand system is consistent with a representative consumer regardless.





















that variants within the same ﬁrm are substitutes if intra-nest elasticity (ﬁrst term)
dominates the inter-nest elasticity.
11This condition holds, for example, for the nested logit model when σB ≥ σA.
133.2 Consumer surplus
Just as Vi was interpreted as a conditional beneﬁt function, the expected
maximum of the ui p r o v i d e sau t i l i t a r i a nm e a s u r et h a tw es h a l lu s ea sa
consumer welfare measure. The consumer surplus for the population of












g(ej)de1...den,( 1 5 )
with Vi given by (5). We show below how (15) enables us to recover
the demand system. Using an argument parallel to that substantiating
Lemma 1, we can establish a parallel property:
Lemma 2 The demand addressed to Firm i is given by:




and the demand for product ik is
Dik = −NPiPk|i = −
∂CS
∂pik
,k=1 ...mi,i =1 ...n.
Indeed, the ﬁrst relation is derived just as before, noting that the
derivative of (15) with respect to Vi uncovers the mass of consumers
who prefer i to the other nests. The second expression then follows from








= −NPiPk|i = −Dik
Once more, these demands are consistent with Roy’s identity and the
reason (as shown below in Proposition 1) is that (15) is a valid indirect
utility function.
14If Firm i sells all its mi variants at the same price and if all the ﬁrms
have the same attractivity (i.e. ˆ Vi = V , i =1 ...n), then, following the






and B(.) is increasing and concave in n (i.e., B0 (n) > 0 and B00 (n) < 0).
Parallel to Assumption A, we now suppose:
ASSUMPTION B: Marginal inter-nest surplus is inelastic with




In the symmetric case (same prices and same number of variants per
ﬁrm) the expression (15) reduces to (cf. the argument preceding (7)):
CS = N [y − p + σAA(m)+σBB(n)]. (17)
One interpretation of the demand model uses the choice of restaurant
meal as an example. The selection of a particular dish at a particular
restaurant can be seen as the outcome of a two-stage process. The ﬁrst
stage is the choice of restaurant, and the second is that of a speciﬁcd i s h
oﬀered there. The consumer knows that when she gets to the restaurant,
she will order the dish that pleases her most (as per (2)). However, before
getting there she does not know precisely what is on the menu that
day (but she does know her distribution of valuations of dishes). The
valuation she attributes to a speciﬁc restaurant comprises an individual-
15speciﬁc match component (σBεi in equation (9)) plus the expected value
of choosing the best dish once gets there (Vi).
Another interpretation of the model is to treat the general form of
(15) as the indirect utility function of a representative consumer:
Proposition 1 The demand model (1) with (4) and (10) is consistent
with the preferences of a representative consumer whose indirect utility
function can be written as (15).
Proof. We need to show that (15) is an indirect utility function.
F i r s tn o t et h a t( f r o m( 1 3 ) )∂Dik/∂pjh = ∂Djh/∂pik since ∂Pi/∂Vj =
∂Pj/∂Vi (i 6= j) from the deﬁnition of Pi and Pj;f r o m( 1 4 ) ,∂Dik/∂pil =
∂Dil/∂pik since ∂Pk|i/∂pij = ∂Pl|i/∂pik. Hence the matrix of cross-
d e r i v a t i v e si ss y m m e t r i c . T h i sp r o p e r t yi se q u i v a l e n tt ot h es y m m e t r y
of the Slutsky matrix for the representative consumer. We also require
that the indirect utility function be quasi-convex in prices (see also Mc-
Fadden, 1981). Indeed, here it is convex in prices since the maximum
of linear functions is convex. The demand model is therefore consistent
with the preferences of a representative consumer whose indirect utility
function is given by (15).
The representative consumer approach provides an alternative theo-
retic underpinning to the demand model. Representative consumer mod-
els (with diﬀerent structural assumptions) have been previously used by
Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to compare optimum with
equilibrium product diversity when ﬁrms sell but one product each.
164 Welfare analysis
O nt h ec o s ts i d e ,l e tK(mi)=k0 + k1mi denote the ﬁxed costs of a
ﬁrm with mi variants, with k0 therefore the ﬁxed cost per ﬁrm. Average
variable production costs for Firm i are constant and given by c per unit.
These cost assumptions can correspond to a single production line which
must be closed down (to alter speciﬁcations) to switch production to a
diﬀerent variant: the more often the line is closed down to switch, the
bigger the cost.12
The welfare maximand is assumed to be the sum of consumer surplus
and ﬁrm proﬁts. The social surplus analysis is simpliﬁed using prices to
decentralize the optimum: clearly marginal cost pricing does the trick.
We show in Appendix 1 that optimality requires that each ﬁrm produces
t h es a m ea m o u n to fe a c ho fi t sv a r i a n t sa n dt h a ta l lp r o d u c tr a n g e sm u s t
b et h es a m es i z e .H e n c ee a c hﬁr mp r o d u c e st h es a m eq u a n t i t yo fe a c h
of m products. This renders the welfare function, W,q u i t es i m p l e ,a s
the following result summarizes:
Proposition 2 The social optimum entails each ﬁrm producing the same
number of variants, m, and producing an equal quantity, N/mn,o fe a c h
12An alternative cost assumption, we can consider Firm i as running mi diﬀerent
production lines, each with its own ﬁxed and variable costs. The two cost assumptions
are formally equivalent when marginal production costs are constant. The model can
readily be extended (but with additional notational heaviness) to convex production
costs.
17variant. The welfare function is
W (m,n)=N [y + σAA(m)+σBB (n)] − nK (m) − cN. (18)
We can now determine the optimal values of m and n.
4.1 Optimum number of ﬁrms and variety
Given Proposition 2, the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal choice of
m implicitly deﬁnes the locus mo (n) which is the optimal product range
f o rag i v e nn u m b e ro fﬁrms. Thus mo solves13 ∂W (m,n)/∂m =0 ,o r
NσAA
0 (m
o) − nk1 =0 . (19)







which is necessarily negative since A00 < 0. The larger the number of
ﬁrms, the more narrow the desired product range of each one because
more ﬁrms can substitute for range size.
Likewise, the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal choice of n implic-
itly deﬁnes the locus no (m) which is the optimal number of ﬁrms for a
given product range and solves ∂W (m,n)/∂n =0 ,o r
NσBB
0 (n
o) − K (m)=0 . (21)
13Note that this also corresponds to setting λ =0in (41) in Appendix 1 for mj,
since when M is optimally chosen in the maximization problem the marginal social
beneﬁt of an extra variant is identically zero.







where the negative slope follows from the concavity of B (.).T h es o l u t i o n
does not involve either the number of ﬁrms nor the product range size
t e n d i n gt oi n ﬁnity since the marginal beneﬁt from each source of diversity
goes to zero as n or m get large enough while marginal costs are strictly
positive. The solution does not involve either value going to zero as long
as the corresponding costs are low enough, which we assume.
The loci mo (n) and no (m) (see equations (19) and (21)) are illus-
trated in Figure 1. The intersection of the two loci is the social optimum.
Insert here Figure 1:T h eo p t i m a ln u m b e ro fﬁrms and product ranges.
In the Figure, we have drawn the curve mo (n) as more shallow than
no (m) around the intersection point. We now argue that this relation








Now, this is also the condition that the determinant of the matrix
of second derivatives of W be strictly negative. Since (19) and (21)
are strictly decreasing in mo and no, respectively, the Hessian of W
is negative deﬁnite if the inequality above holds. Thus, if (23) holds
at any intersection of the two loci, then since the loci are continuous
19functions, we know that they can only intersect once and that this unique
intersection point must be a local maximum. The solution does not
involve either the number of ﬁrms nor the product range size tending to
inﬁnity since the marginal beneﬁt from each source of diversity goes to
zero as n or m get large enough while marginal costs are strictly positive.
The solution does not involve either value going to zero as long as the
corresponding costs are low enough, which we assume.
Therefore there is an intersection of the two loci, it is unique, and
constitutes a global maximum of W (m,n) if (23) holds there. For (23)
t oh o l da ta n yi n t e r s e c t i o no ft h et w ol o c i ,t h e ni tm u s tb et h a t( 1 9 )a n d
(21) hold, so that we can use these relations to substitute out the µ’s











Deﬁning ηA0 as the (absolute value of the) elasticity of A0 and similarly
for ηB0 and ηK =
k1m





Assumptions A and B imply ηA0 ≥ 1 and ηB0 ≥ 1. The inequality
then must hold since ηK < 1 (marginal cost for increasing the product
range is lower than average cost).
Hence, (19) and (21) characterize the unique global maximum of (18),
and via Proposition 2, of the social welfare. To summarize:
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions A and B, the social optimum num-
ber of ﬁrms and the optimum variety are the unique positive solution of
20(19) and (21).
When σA rises, the mo (n) locus shifts up in Figure 1 while the no (m)
locus remains unchanged. Thus a greater preference for variety within
the ﬁrm leads to larger product ranges which leads to fewer ﬁrms since
the two dimensions of diversity are substitutes. Conversely, the case of
single product ﬁrms arises for σA is small enough. A similar analysis
implies that the optimal number of ﬁrms decreases as σB decreases but
that range size rises. For σB low enough there is optimally a single ﬁrm
on the market.
The comparative static properties with respect to market size, N,
and cost parameters, also involve simple shifts of the loci in Figure 1.
They are quite intuitive and are left to the reader.
5 Market equilibrium
We are interested in characterizing the symmetric equilibrium at which
ne ﬁrms each produce me products.14 We proceed in two steps. First
we consider the symmetric equilibrium choice of product ranges for a
given number of ﬁrms, me(n). Then we discuss the equilibrium number
of ﬁrms, as determined by the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n ,w h e na l lﬁrms have
t h es a m es i z eo fp r o d u c tr a n g e .T h i sg i v e st h ene(m) locus. Throughout
we ignore the integer constraint and treat both n and m as continuous
14We shall not be concerned here about showing that such an equilibrium exists,
although we note that existence and symmetry was proved for the special case treated
in Anderson and de Palma (1992), so we are not dealing with a vacuous problem.
21variables (as in the previous section). The intersection of the ne(m) and
me(n) loci gives the equilibrium.
5.1 Equilibrium price
The equilibrium is that of a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms
enter the market. In the second stage they choose product ranges, and
in the third stage they choose prices, which are the same for all the
products of any ﬁrm.15 At each stage they internalize the eﬀects of their
decisions on the subsequent sub-game equilibria. In the last (price) stage,
if all ﬁrms produce the same number of variants, m,a n da l lo t h e rﬁrms
charge the same price for all their variants, then the inter-ﬁrm choice
probabilities are independent of m,s ot h a tp r o ﬁti s
πi = N (pi − c)Pi(ˆ Vi, ˆ V−i) − K(m), (25)
where the second argument in Firm i’s choice probability function, ˆ V−i,
denotes the vector of all other expected surpluses, given that each ﬁrm
charges the same price for all its variants.
The candidate symmetric equilibrium price satisﬁes:
∂πi
∂pi
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Sym
= N (pi − c)
















15It can be readily shown that each ﬁrm optimally sets the same price for each of
its variants. This property follows from maximizing proﬁt within the nest, subject
to the constraint of providing a given expected surplus level, ˆ Vi.
22where Ω(n) is deﬁn e di n( 1 2 ) .
Note that the equilibrium price (26) is independent of m since A(mi)
i st h es a m ef o ra l lﬁrms. This is because the product range eﬀect cancels
out in a cross-ﬁrm comparison of attractiveness. The equilibrium price is
a simple mark-up that depends only on the degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity
and the number of ﬁrms. Since Ω(n) is increasing under log-concavity
of g(.) (see Anderson et al., 1995), the price of each ﬁrm’s product range
f a l l st h em o r ec o m p e t i n gﬁrms there are.
The quantities Ω(n) and B0(n) depend on the density function g(.)
and satisfy the following property.
Lemma 3 (Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov, 1995). If the density
function g(.) is log-concave, then nΩ(n)B0(n) < 1.
Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995) actually show that16








Since B (.) is strictly concave, the left-hand-side exceeds B0 (n) and so
the inequality given in the Lemma above follows immediately.
5.2 Equilibrium versus optimum varieties
We ﬁrst determine the equilibrium product range, for n ﬁxed. Then, we
consider the free entry equilibrium. In the product range stage, suppose
16This version would enable us to explicitly consider the issue that the number of
ﬁrms should be an integer. The product line analysis is rather more cumbersome
with explicit integer constraints though.
23ﬁrm i produces mi variants while all other produce m variants each.
Firm i’s proﬁti st h e n
πi = N (pi − c)Pi(mi, ¯ m;pi, ¯ p) − K(mi), (27)















where d¯ p/dmi denotes the change in the equilibrium price set by all




∂pi,a n dt h a t
∂Pi
∂¯ p = −
∂Pi




















Using (pi − c)
∂Pi
∂pi +Pi =0(i.e. the ﬁrst-order condition for pricing) and
evaluating equation (28) at a symmetric equilibrium for the equilibrium






− nk1 =0 . (29)
This equation characterizes the me (n) locus. In comparison with equa-
tion (19), the only diﬀerence between the equilibrium and the optimum
is the term Ndp/dmi which can be interpreted as a strategic eﬀect on
equilibrium prices. It is shown in Appendix 2 that this term is negative.
Lemma 4. Rivals’ equilibrium prices fall as Firm i boosts its product
range: dp/dmi < 0.
24The equilibrium product range for a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, me(n),i s
therefore smaller than the optimum one. In terms of Figure 1,t h eme(n)
l o c u si sb e l o wt h emo(n) locus. As seen from the analysis above, the
diﬀerence is completely attributable to a strategic eﬀe c tt h a tc o m p e t i n g
ﬁrms internalize. Adding a variant leads to more intense competition
and lower prices of rivals’ variants. At the margin, ﬁrms avoid too much
provocation by holding back on their product ranges.
Now consider the equilibrium number of ﬁrms for given symmetric




(p(n) − c) − K(m)=0 ,
Using (26), the equilibrium number of ﬁrms, ne,o fﬁrms satisﬁes:
NσB
neΩ(ne)
− K(m)=0 . (30)
This equation characterizes the ne (m) locus and is directly comparable
with (21) for the optimal number of ﬁrms. The ne(m) locus lies right
of the no(m) locus if nΩ(n)B0(n) < 1. This is precisely the condition in
Lemma 3.
Insert here Figure 2: Equilibrium and optimum product variety
The consequent results are illustrated in Figure 2,w h e r ew es e et h a t
the optimum number of ﬁrms is smaller than the equilibrium number
and the optimum product variety is larger than the equilibrium one. An-
derson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995) established over-entry of single-
25product ﬁrms: the special assumptions made here allow us to establish
this property more broadly.17 We summarize our results in
Proposition 4 Given unit demand by consumers, the market equilib-
rium involves too many ﬁrms and too few products per ﬁrm with respect
to the optimum.
Since ﬁrms hold back on product ranges to lessen price competition,
prices stay excessively high so that proﬁts exceed the social value of a
ﬁrm and too many ﬁrms enter the market. In the next section we relax
the assumption of unit demand.
6 Variable consumption
The analysis so far has treated unit demand by consumers insofar as
each consumer has been assumed to buy one unit of the preferred good
independently of the price level. In this section, we broaden the vista to
allow the quantity demanded to depend in a decreasing fashion on price.
We retain the discrete choice assumption at the level of choice of good
to buy, but we allow the quantity of that good bought to decrease with
price. We make extensive use of Roy’s identity in the demand relations.
Our extension allows us to pick up the classic case of CES preferences
here extended to the nested CES.
17In the earlier analysis, the equilibrium and optimum coincide only if the taste
density is log-linear. Here, even if this condition holds for g(.) so that the no (m)
l o c u si sc o i n c i d e n tw i t ht h ene (m) locus, the divergence of the other loci suﬃces to
encourage strict over-entry.
26T h eb a s i cd e m a n ds t r u c t u r ei sa sa b o v ee x c e p tt h a tw ew r i t ed e m a n d
as
Dik = Nq(pik)PiPk|i,
where the function q(.) is to be interpreted as a conditional demand
function (conditional on choosing product ik) and the probability com-
ponents are much as before.
The extension works as follows. Let the conditional (indirect) utility
of consumer buying variant (ik) be uik = y+v(pik)+σAεik,w h e r ev(pik)
is the conditional surplus function. This surplus function is increasing
and convex. Applying Roy’s identity yields the conditional demand as
q(pik)=−v0 (pik).18 Given that the consumer who selects Firm i will
choose the variant ik that maximizes uik, the conditional probability of
choosing good ik in nest i when all intra-nest prices are equal to pi is just
Pk|i =1/ mi and the expected demand for the variants sold by Firm i is
just Nq(pi)Pi.H e r e ,Pi is determined by the attractivity of the various














dx, i =1 ...n,
where Vj = y+v(pj)+σAA(mj),w h e nF i r mj set the same price pj for
all of its variants. We return to these expressions below when we ﬁnd
18I nt h ea n a l y s i su pt oh e r ew eh a v ea s s u m e de ﬀectively that v(pik)=−pik;
applying Roy’s identity yields the conditional demand as unity, which is consistent
with the unit demand assumption.
27the market equilibrium.
Proposition 5 The nested demand model with variable consumption
is consistent with the preferences of a representative consumer whose


























Proof. Following the lines used in the proof of Proposition 1, we
need to show that the matrix of cross-derivatives is symmetric, and that
the indirect utility function is quasi-convex in prices. The ﬁrst property
follows since ∂CS/∂pjh = NPj∂Vj/∂pjh and ∂Vj/∂pjh = −q(pjh)Ph|j,
so ∂CS/∂pjh = −Djh. (Indeed, the cross-derivative is ∂2CS/∂pjh∂pik =
q(pjh)q(pik)Ph|jPk|i∂Pi/∂Vj, from which symmetry is apparent since in
discrete choice models ∂Pi/∂Vj = ∂Pj/∂Vi). The second argument fol-
lows since v(.) is convex and therefore V (.) is convex in prices (this is
a property of the maximum operator). Moreover, the function CS(.) is
then convex in prices for the same reason.
We now ﬁnd the optimum allocation. Under symmetry, all of the
V 0s are equal and the social surplus is given by
W = N [y + v(p)+σBB(n)+σAA(m)] + nπ. (31)
We look for a second-best optimum such that ﬁrms are constrained to
make zero proﬁts. This means that aggregate net revenues minus the
28total set-up cost is zero or
nπ = N (p − c)q(p) − nK(m)=0 . (32)
The corresponding Lagrangian L(m,n,p,λ) is:
L=N [y + v(p)+σAA(m)+σBB(n)]+(1 + λ)[N (p − c)q(p) − nK(m)],
where λ denotes the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the aggregate
zero-proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t . T h eﬁrst-order condition for the locus mo (n) is












q(p)+( p − c)q0 (p)
, (35)
and the ﬁnal ﬁrst order condition is (32).
We now derive the analogous conditions for the equilibrium. The
proﬁto fF i r mi is
πi = N (pi − c)q(pi)Pi − K (mi).















29where V denotes the common attractivity of each other ﬁrm. Note
that V incorporates the sub-game equilibrium prices ensuing from the
product range game. Using an argument analogous to that in Appendix
2, ∂V
∂mi is positive: rival ﬁrms decrease their equilibrium prices (as so raise
their attractivities) when Firm i increases its product range. Note too
that the expression for
dπi
dmi also uses the envelope theorem in the fact
that pi is optimally chosen by Firm i in the pricing sub-game. Now,
∂Pi
∂mi























where Ψ =( pi − c)q(pi)
∂Pi
∂Vi.
We can use the ﬁrst-order condition for the choice of pi to rewrite Ψ.
This pricing ﬁrst-order condition (
dπi
dpi =0 )i s :
q(pi)Pi +( pi − c)q








∂y = v0 (pi)=−q(pi)), we get:
Ψ =
q(pi)+( pi − c)q0 (pi)
q(pi)
Pi. (38)
At a symmetric equilibrium, Pi =1 /n, and noting that
∂Vi
∂mi =

























q(p)+( p − c)q0 (p)
nk1. (39)
Comparing this expression with the relation for the optimum, (33) with
(35), for the same values of n and p,t h ev a l u eo fm solving this expression
is lower, so that me (n) <m o (n).
Similarly, the free entry condition is: π = N (p − c)q(p)/n−K (m)=






σBn (by (11)) so
that this zero proﬁt condition becomes NΨσB/Ω(n)=K (m).N o w





q(p)+( p − c)q0 (p)
. (40)
From (35), the LHS is simply K (m)(1+λ) when the price is the
same as at the optimum (i.e., when the zero-proﬁtc o n s t r a i n th o l d s ) .
Comparing then (34) with (40) and using Lemma 3 (nΩ(n)B0 (n) < 1)
s h o w st h a tf o rt h es a m ev a l u e so fm and p,t h ev a l u eo fn solving (40)
is higher. This means that ne (m) >n o(m).
In summary, both relations hold just as in Figure 2 for the extension
to variable (price-sensitive) individual demand. This implies that the
conclusion of the previous section applies to this case, with the qual-
iﬁcation that the welfare benchmark is the second best subject to a
zero-proﬁt constraint. In summary:
Proposition 6 The market equilibrium involves too many ﬁrms and too
few products per ﬁrm with respect to the zero-proﬁt constrained second-
best social optimum.
317C o n c l u s i o n s
We have emphasized in this paper that there is a systematic market
bias towards over-entry of ﬁrms and too narrow product lines. The
latter eﬀect provokes and attenuates the former: because product line
competition is strategically restricted to moderate price competition,
proﬁts are kept higher than is optimal. This in turn encourages and
exacerbates the excess entry that is the hallmark of models on optimal
and market variety for single product ﬁrms.
Our analysis follows the Chamberlin (1933) tradition in its interest in
comparing equilibrium and optimal diversity, but there is another par-
allel that bears developing. Chamberlin looked at single-product ﬁrms
and assumed a production cost structure that is familiar in standard
perfectly competitive analysis, a U-shaped average cost function. He
noted that his “tangency condition” of the perceived demand (dd) with
average production cost implied that production is below minimum eﬃ-
cient scale, namely the “excess capacity” theorem. He then noted that
this conﬁguration may be close to the optimum because a preference
for product variety implies that production eﬃciencies ought not be ex-
hausted. Instead, production at a lower scale enables more varieties to
be produced, albeit at a higher price per unit bought. We have concen-
trated on the product range of multiproduct ﬁrms, but in the text have
assumed that production costs are constant as a function of both output
per variety and the number of varieties. The more interesting of the two
generalizations is to allow the cost function for varieties to be U-shaped
32as a function of mi.
That is, suppose now that K (m)/m has the classic U shape as a
function of m (with K0 (m) passing through its minimum).19 Notice
ﬁr s tt h a tt h e( z e r op r o ﬁt constrained) optimum solution has the range
size below the minimum average cost if consumers value products pro-
duced by diﬀerent ﬁr m sm o r et h a na ne x t e n s i o ni nt h er a n g eo fag i v e n
ﬁrm at the margin.20 The equilibrium relation then looks similar to a
Chamberlinian tangency, although his demand curve is replaced by an
average revenue curve per product. This slopes down because of the
cannibalization eﬀe c ta n dt h ep r o p e r t yt h a tal a r g e rr a n g et o u g h e n st h e
competition. This tangency equilibrium is at a lower range level than
the optimal range by the result we have emphasized that ﬁrms’ keep
their ranges too narrow.
Our equilibrium analysis also yields some predictions for empirical
regularities. For example, larger markets (higher N) typically attract
more ﬁr m si ns t a n d a r dm o d e l so fp r o d u c td i ﬀe r e n t i a t i o n( a n di na c t u a l
markets, comparing across cities or countries). This source of higher
product diversity underscores a key source of gains from trade in the
context of globalization. The endogenous product ranges in the current
19The elasticity form of the optimality condition corrsponding to (24) is now ηA0 +
ηK0 >
ηK
ηB0 ,w h e r eηK0 is the elasticity of K0 (m).
20To see this, suppose that product ranges were above the minimum eﬃcient scale.
Then reducing product ranges and creating new ﬁrms at the same time (in order
to keep the total number of products constant) would raise consumer beneﬁts from
variety. At the same time this would reduce average production costs per variety, so
there is a distinct gain in shifting.
33analysis provide a further source of potential gains from market expan-
sion. Larger markets provide the incentive for ﬁrms to bring in broader
product ranges (for given ﬁrm numbers) since the ﬁxed costs of bring-
i n gi nm o r ep r o d u c t si ss p r e a do v e r a broader consumer base. Larger
markets also lead more ﬁrms to enter, for any given product range size.
In terms of Figure 2, both curves shift out with N.T h u s o n e w o u l d
expect both wider product ranges and more ﬁrms in larger markets, so
two types of increased variety.
Finally, the over-entry result bears comment. Our solution concept
uses free-entry equilibrium with many ﬁrms driving proﬁtt oz e r o . I n
markets that are small relative to costs of ﬁrm and product introduction,
there is room for more complex strategic behavior with respect to entry
deterrence. In particular, it was noted in the text that broader product
ranges give rise to more intense competition. For entry deterrence, this is
a good thing (see also Schmalensee, 1979). Indeed, insofar as one might
then expect fewer ﬁrms, and more products per ﬁrm than our current
solution, this type of deterrence equilibrium may be closer to the social
optimum than the free entry equilibrium we consider. The deterrence
solution remains an open research question.
34Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that Firm i has product range mi.
Optimality requires that it charges the same price, denoted pi,f o ra l l
its variants. Under symmetry, Vi reduces to b Vi = y −pi +σAA(mi) (see
(7)).





we recall from Lemma 2 that ∂CS/∂b Vi = −∂CS/∂pi = Di. Suppose
the total number of variants is ﬁxed at M =
Pn
i=1 mi. The choice of









































Given that prices are optimally chosen, and treating the mi as perfectly








− k1 = µ. (41)
21It is also satisﬁed by choosing identical markups over marginal cost, since
Pn
i=1 ∂Di/∂pj =0 , for all j =1 ...n.
35S i n c em a r k - u p sa r ei d e n t i c a l ,t h em i d d l et e r mo nt h eL H Si sz e r o ,a n d
thus σAA0 (mj)Dj − k1 = µ, j =1 ...n. T h i si m p l i e st h a t mj = mi =
m,i,j =1 ...n,s i n c eA(.) is concave and Dj is increasing in mj. Q.E.D.
Appendix 2
Proof of Lemma 4.
We show here that d¯ p/dmi < 0, i.e. that competitors decrease their
prices ¯ p as a deviant ﬁrm (Firm i) increases its product range, mi.T h e




+ Pj =0 ,j=1 ...n. (A1)





n−1(α + x)dx, (A2)
where α ≡ [A(mi) − A(¯ m)+¯ p − pi]/σA, the relative attractiveness of
ﬁrm i. We henceforth set σA =1to ease clutter. Note also that
∂Pi
∂pi




n−2(α + x)dx. (A3)
For the other ﬁrms, we must evaluate Pj and ∂Pj/∂pj at a symmetric
common price, ¯ p,s o
















Note this is not t h ed e r i v a t i v eo f( A 4 )s i n c e(pi, ¯ p) should be the Nash
equilibrium price sub-game stemming from (mi, ¯ m).
To ﬁnd d¯ p/dmi, we totally diﬀerentiate the two types of (A1) - for
ﬁrm i and for a representative ﬁrm k 6= i.D e ﬁne
h(pi, ¯ p,mi)=( pi − c)
∂Pi
∂pi
+ Pi =0 (A6)
and
g(pi, ¯ p,mi)=(¯ p − c)
∂Pk(¯ p)
∂pk
+ P =0 , (A7)
where all arguments are then to be evaluated at a symmetric solution,





















The denominator is the product of own eﬀects minus the product of














∂mi) < 0.F r o m( A 6 ) ,t h et e r mi nb r a c k e t s
is simply −A0(mi)
∂Pi
∂pi > 0,s oi ts u ﬃces to show that
∂g















37We can use the ﬁrst order condition (A7) to simplify the remaining terms















Now, evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium, (pi =¯ p, mi =¯ m), P =1 /n







































To prove (A11), recall that log-concavity of f (·) implies that Pi is log-
concave. The latter condition implies that [∂Pi/∂α]/Pi is decreasing in
α, or, using (A2) and (A3), this implies that the expression
(n − 1)
R
I1 f(x)f(α + x)Fn−2(α + x)dx
R
I1 f(x)Fn−1(α + x)dx











This condition is equivalent to (A11). Q.E.D.
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o(m) Figure 2: Equilibrium and optimum variety 
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